The growth and international expansion of an emerging market retailer in Latin America by Bianchi, Constanza
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Bianchi, Constanza (2011) The growth and international expansion of an
emerging market retailer in Latin America. Journal of Global Marketing,
24(4), pp. 357-379.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/47704/
c© Copyright 2011 Routledge
This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the [Journal of
Global Marketing] c© [2011] [copyright Taylor & Francis]; [Journal of Global
Marketing] is available online at: www.tandfonline.com
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08911762.2011.602324
 
 
0 
 
THE GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION OF AN EMERGING MARKET 
RETAILER IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constanza Bianchi, Ph.D. 
Teaching and Research Fellow 
School of Advertising, Marketing and Public Relations 
Faculty of Business 
Queensland University of Technology 
2 George Street, Brisbane, Queensland, 4001 
Australia 
Telephone: 61 7 – 3138 1354 
Fax: 6 17 – 3138 1811 
E-mail: constanza.bianchi@qut.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
THE GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION OF AN EMERGING MARKET 
RETAILER IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study contributes to the literature on international retailing by addressing a gap in the 
literature as to how retailers from emerging markets expand internationally. This historical case 
study analyzes the growth and internationalization process of Chilean retailer Falabella, one of 
the largest in Latin America and has been able to compete with multinationals from developed 
countries. The research is based upon primary and secondary data sources including 33 oral 
interviews with company managers and family executives, as well as industry data, corporate 
reports, and trade journals. Drawing on institutional theory, the findings show that by 
belonging to a family conglomerate, engaging in networks and partnerships, organizational 
learning, and having an experienced management team helped Falabella gain legitimacy in all 
international markets.  
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INTRODUCCTION 
 
This paper explores a historical case study of the national and international expansion of 
the Chilean retailer Falabella S.A.I.C. (Falabella from now on). Falabella is the largest 
department store in Latin America, and one of the most diversified, respected, competitive, and 
profitable retail corporations in the region (e.g., Deloitte, 2009; Estrategia, 2010). At the end of 
2009, this company celebrated its 120th anniversary with the following slogan “Falabella with 
you… all your life”. Falabella has operations in Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Colombia, and is a 
remarkable example of an emerging market retailer that has become an important regional 
actor in Latin America.  
Academic research on international retailing has focused predominantly on retail 
corporations from developed countries such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, M&S, and Home Depot 
among others (Arnold, 2002; Bianchi and Ostale, 2006; Lowe and Wrigley, 2009). Moreover, 
historical research on retailing is directed mostly at companies from the United States, Europe, 
and Japan (Cohen, 1996; Stanger, 2010). Nevertheless, retail companies from emerging market 
are also expanding abroad and competing successfully with large companies from developed 
nations, yet scant historical research has addressed this phenomena. 
Emerging markets are becoming more notorious in the world economy as a result of the 
increasing levels of development and government policies that favor economic liberalization 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). However, their contexts are characterized by institutional turbulence 
and lower levels of economic development compared to developed nations (Welsh et al., 
2006). Although some research on emerging market firms has been conducted in Asian and 
Eastern European countries (e.g., Mathews, 2006; Singh et al., 2010; Tsai and Eisingerich, 
2010), most of this research considers the manufacturing sector. Thus, there is little 
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understanding in the academic literature concerning how retail firms from emerging markets 
expand internationally.  
Moreover, emerging markets are heterogeneous in their level of development and 
environmental surroundings (Gaur and Kumar, 2010). This can lead to differences in the 
internationalization process of firms that are located in different geographical areas. 
Consequently, conducting research in different regions of the world therefore provides an 
opportunity to verify existing theories, as well as extend and develop new theoretical 
frameworks (Gaur and Kumar, 2010; Gaur et al., 2011). Furthermore, fewer studies have been 
conducted on the internationalization process of Latin American firm, and these predominantly 
consider Brazilian companies (Arbix, 2010; Cyrino et al., 2010). Since Latin America’s current 
strategies of market liberalization rely heavily on private initiative and entrepreneurship, it is 
essential to learn more about how firms in other countries of the region are perusing 
international expansion. Thus, insights from a historical case study on Chilean retail 
internationalization will aid in a better understanding of the internationalization process of 
retailers from the Latin American region. 
The theoretical framework for the analysis is institutional theory, which suggests that 
every country has a set of relevant institutional norms that retailers must conform to in order to 
be perceived as legitimate by the relevant social actors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). According to this theory, survival in international markets will be more 
likely when organizations achieve legitimacy from social actors or adapting their practices and 
structures to the relevant institutional norms of the foreign market (strategic isomorphism). 
This article begins with a review of the literature on retail internationalization and 
emerging markets. Next, the theoretical framework is presented and followed by a narrative of 
the historical case study, where several phases are identified. Then, a discussion of the findings 
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and implications for understanding how retailers from emerging markets become international 
players is followed by the contribution of this study and avenues for future research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Internationalization Process 
The internationalization process has been the focus of increasing theoretical and empirical 
research in the marketing and retailing discipline (e.g., Alexander and Myers, 2000; Cavusgil, 
1980). The internationalization process is described in general as the stages composing the 
gradual international expansion of a firm’s operations. The literature on international business 
has contributed to the development of several theoretical frameworks for understanding the 
process of retail internationalization. The stages model (Cavusgil, 1980; Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977) holds that firms internationalize through a process of incremental stages, and as they 
gain more experience, they increase their commitment to international activities and accept 
higher risks of entering and operating in new and more distant markets. This model assumes 
that international expansion is influenced strongly by managerial learning and commitment, 
which enables them to overcome the risks and costs associated to internationalization.  
A different model of internationalization is the eclectic theory (Dunning, 1988; Dunning, 
1981), which is based largely on the idea that international companies have specific advantages 
that can be exploited in a foreign market in a timely way. This approach to internationalization 
suggests that there are three factors that must be present for international expansion: 
ownership-specific, location-specific, and internalization advantages. Ownership advantages 
refer to firm specific assets and skills, innovative products, processes or business methods, 
which provide the firm with a competitive advantage in the market. Location advantages relate 
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to particular advantages or market opportunities that are present in the host country. 
Internalization advantages refer to the benefits of retaining assets and skills within the firm.  
A third approach to internationalization is network theory, which draws on the theories of 
social exchange and resource dependency and focuses on firm behavior in the context of inter-
organizational and interpersonal relationships. This network approach suggests that 
internationalization is a result of interaction and the development of relationships over time and 
views international growth as based largely on sharing complementary competitive advantages 
with other firms (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988).  
The stages and eclectic models of internationalization have mainly considered the process of 
manufacturing firms, yet retail scholars have found these models useful to develop specific 
internationalization frameworks for retailers (e.g., Alexander and Myers, 2000).  
 
Retail Internationalization 
The history of international retailing indicates that retailers from the US and Europe were 
among the first to establish international operations in the early part of the 20th century 
(Alexander, 1997; Hollander, 1970). For example, the US variety retailer Woolworth expanded 
to Canada in 1897, to the UK by the end of 1909, and to Germany by the end of 1926. The 
department store Sears Roebuck also expanded from the US to contiguous markets such as 
Cuba in 1942, and Mexico in 1947 (Alexander, 1997). Merely during the 1970s, European 
retailers such as the hypermarket Carrefour have developed enough capabilities to enter the 
US, the Pacific Rim and Latin American markets (Fernie, 1992). Overall, these retailers have 
had an important impact on the diffusion of retail formats such as supermarkets, hypermarkets, 
department stores and variety stores around the world, and this international activity has grown 
exponentially in the last 20 years (Alexander and Doherty, 2010).  
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A vast amount of retail literature has emerged examining international activities of 
European and North American retailers, such as international retail involvement (Vida et al., 
2000), the extent and direction of international retail activity (Sternquist, 1997; Treadgold, 
1991), market selection (Gripsrud and Benito, 2005; Swoboda et al., 2007), market entry 
method (Doherty, 2009), and recently international retail divestment and failure (Alexander 
and Quinn, 2002; Bianchi and Ostale, 2006). A few studies have attempted to develop 
theoretical frameworks to assess the retail internationalization process (Alexander and Myers, 
2000; Vida and Fairhurst, 1998). These studies draw from the internationalization theories, but 
also incorporate specific elements of retailing found in the literature.  
When retailers internationalise, they transfer their source of competitive advantage to a 
new market, and usually attempt to operate in foreign markets in the same way as they do in 
their domestic market (Evans et al., 2008). Even though retail firms perform exceptionally well 
in their domestic country, when they internationalise, many encounter difficulties in dealing 
with the complexities of differences in local regulations and consumer tastes. These obstacles 
hinder retailer international performance and in some cases lead the firm to withdraw from 
certain foreign markets (e.g., Bianchi and Ostale, 2006).  
Theoretical frameworks on retail internationalization suggest that international retailer 
competitive advantage is associated to the firm’s internal organizational and managerial 
capabilities as well as the necessary resources for international expansion (Alexander and 
Myers, 2000; Dawson, 1994; Sternquist, 1997; Vida and Fairhurst, 1998). Firm characteristics 
refer to the retailer’s source of competitive advantage, such as the uniqueness of products, 
merchandise assortment, unique retail concept, or competitive pricing, along with the 
necessary resources for international expansion. Management characteristics refer to the 
experience, attitude, and leadership qualities of managers that participate in this process. 
Alexander and Myers (2000) argue that the source of advantage exploited by a retailer is 
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formulated within a set of domestic environmental factors, and when transferring this source of 
advantage to a different market, conditions may change and the retailer will receive the 
influence of host environmental pressures. Thus, both theoretical frameworks for addressing 
retail internationalization acknowledge that an ownership advantage is developed within 
certain environmental characteristics which may not be present in a new market.  
Moreover, recent research in this area also stresses the importance of the learning 
processes for retail internationalisation (Palmer and Quinn, 2005). The learning process is 
perceived as fundamental for retailers operating in the international market as mentioned by 
Alexander and Myers (2000, p.347), “within the international environment, the organisation’s 
internal facilitating competencies will alter as the organisation learns, or fails to learn, from the 
collection of markets in which it operates”.  
In conclusion, the previous studies have contributed to the understanding of many aspects 
of retail internationalization, however international performance as such has been overlooked, 
particularly for retailers from emerging markets (Alexander and Doherty, 2010). Specifically, 
how retail firms modify their operations and strategies in light of international experience is 
less known. 
 
Internationalization of Emerging Market Firms 
Theoretical approaches to retail internationalization have predominantly focused on 
manufacturing firms located in developed markets (Luo and Peng, 1999). Some scholars argue 
that these theories may not suitable to explain the internationalization process of firms from 
emerging countries, which are generally less resource endowed and competitive than firms 
from developed markets.  
Emerging markets are defined as low income, rapid growth countries using economic 
liberalization as their primary engine of growth (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Their market contexts 
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are characterized by institutional turbulence and lower levels of economic development 
compared to developed nations (Welsh et al., 2006). Firms from emerging markets may not 
have innovative technology, superior human and financial capital, or world-recognized brands 
(Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Wright et al., 2005). Thus, the previous theories may not suitably 
explain the internationalization behavior of firms from emerging countries, which are generally 
less resource endowed and competitive than firms from developed markets. 
According to studies in the manufacturing sector, emerging market firms may succeed in 
international markets by attaining specific assets that enable them to catch up with international 
players from developed markets (Sinha, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). For example, managers 
from emerging countries may possess knowledge about operation conditions, regulations, 
customers, networks, and marketing methods in less developed countries (Elango and Pattnaik, 
2007; London and Hart, 2004). Luo & Tung (2007) argue that firms from emerging markets 
use internationalization as a springboard to acquire strategic assets needed to compete more 
effectively internationally, such as technology, manufacturing knowledge, managerial 
expertise, and consumer access in key foreign markets.  
Moreover, differences might exist among emerging market regions which are important to 
assess for theoretical development of retail internationalization models (Gaur and Kumar, 
2010). For example, most studies on Asian economies highlight the important role of 
government in the provision of information concerning foreign market conditions (Lu et al., 
2010; Yeoh, 2000). However, research conducted with Latin American does not acknowledge 
de role of government support for internationalization but rather strategies such as engaging in 
alliances with competitors, and networks with regional players (Brenes, 2000). Family 
businesses are also found to be more legitimate than companies from developed markets due to 
their well-established networks and deep understanding of consumers (Guillen, 2000; Kim et 
al., 2004).  
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In the retailing sector, Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and 
Argentina have experienced the arrival of large American and European retail chains such as 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and Casino (Deloitte, 2009). Nevertheless, Chilean retailers are also 
relevant players in these markets an have been able to expanded regionally. Retailers such as 
department store chains Falabella and Ripley, grocery store chain Cencosud, drugstore chain 
FASA, and home improvement retailer Sodimac have become familiar outlets for consumers in 
the Latin American region. Thus, although Chilean retailers have fewer endowments than 
American or European retail chains, they have been able to internationalize successfully in the 
Latin American region. 
According to institutional theory, the ultimate goal of a firm is survival, and organizations 
conform to institutional norms to achieve legitimacy and increase survival capabilities 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The practice of conforming to 
institutional norms in the environment has been defined as strategic isomorphism (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Compliance to the institutional norms helps to establish the organization’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of other social actors who also subscribe to these norms. Institutional 
theory directs the attention to the relevant social actors such as competitors, suppliers, 
employees or consumers which shape the relevant institutional norms in the organization’s 
environment. These norms act as unwritten rules of proper social conduct to which 
organizations must adhere in order to become legitimate (Scott, 1987). In an international 
context organizations are simultaneously subject to institutional pressures from the domestic 
and foreign market, and they must comply to institutional norms in all markets (Westney, 
1993). In conclusion, the theoretical premise of the study is that retail internationalization for 
emerging market retailers is largely dependent on the ability of a retailer to achieve legitimacy 
in the domestic as well as in the international marketplace through strategic isomorphism. The 
main research questions of this study are:  
 
 
10 
 
 How do Chilean retail firms internationalize compared to retailers from developed 
countries?  
 How do they compete against larger multinational retailers from developed 
countries?  
The purpose of this paper is to address these questions through a historical case study of 
Falabella, the leading department store and one of the largest retail conglomerates in the Latin 
American region. Institutional theory is introduced as a theoretical approach for examining the 
previous research questions. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Case study methodology was used to assess the internationalization process of Chilean 
retailer Falabella. Case studies allow researchers to study an organization and its environment in 
a natural setting and obtain rich insights into complex processes (Yin, 1994). This single case 
was considered to be appropriate because it is highly pertinent to the objective of the study 
(Perry, 1998), and the single case approach has been an increasingly popular methodology within 
the retail internationalization literature (Palmer and Quinn, 2007; Sparks, 2000), and recognized 
as particularly useful for examining international strategies of emerging market firms (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000). 
More specifically, this research is based on a single historical case study of Falabella since 
its foundation and growth as well as its regional expansion into Latin America. The narrative 
starts in 1889 when the company was funded as a tailor shop and continues up to 2009. Over the 
years, Falabella has shown consistent growth compared to other local retail competitors and 
internationalization has been a major focus for the company in the last 15 years, which is 
uncommon for retailers from the Latin American region. In fact, Latin American retail 
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international operations comprised only of 9.9% in sales in 2009, thus these retailers have been 
the laggards in going global compared to other regions of the world. 
This historical case study rests on a comprehensive study of primary and secondary data 
sources. Moreover, the narrative is based on 33 oral interviews with Falabella managers, 
executives, and family owners, conducted from 2001 to 2009. These interviews followed 
McCracken’s (1988) long interview approach, and respondents were selected to provide a broad 
representation of the organization, encompassing managers from different areas such as 
marketing, operations, finance, corporate development, as well as country managers and 
executives of the foreign operations of the firm. Secondary sources included corporate reports, 
newspaper articles, historical articles, photographs, and business periodicals. 
Oral interviews were of a semi-structured nature and lasted an average of 90 minutes. 
Interview questions for managers focused on Falabella’s growth and internationalization process 
as well as its performance in each market. Oral interviews with company owners and family 
members focused specifically on narratives, stories, and personal recollections regarding the first 
100 years of the company. Most interviews with managers and company owners located in the 
Chilean market were conducted in person; however, the interviews held with country mangers or 
executives located in Peru, Argentina, and Colombia were conducted via telephone due to 
geographical distance. Interviews were also conducted with managers of external organizations 
directly and indirectly involved in the internationalization process of Falabella, such as banks 
and partner firms. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and for confidentiality reasons, 
the identities of respondents are not disclosed.  
Due to the longitudinal nature of the case being studied, a historical approach was taken 
when analyzing the secondary data and the emphasis was to use previous events that provide 
insights into the present environment (Golder, 2000). The historical method is defined by Golder 
(2000) as a process of collecting, verifying, interpreting, and presenting evidence from the past, 
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with a strong emphasis on critically evaluating the sources of evidence and the evidence itself in 
terms of competence, objectivity, and reliability. This process required looking for original 
documents, and determining the authenticity of the author and adequacy of the time period. 
Newspaper, magazine articles and corporate reports were screened to make sure that they 
belonged to credible sources. Evidence that did not meet these conditions was eliminated.  
The process of analysis and interpretation resulted in inferences, insights, and connections to 
the research question (Spiggle, 1994). Interpretation of the data occurred by iterating back and 
forth from the data to the theory and back to the data again in order to make sense of the data. 
The main goal was to obtain a holistic and illuminating grasp of meaning (Spiggle, 1994). 
Overall, triangulation from interpretations of the interview data and secondary sources, along 
with institutional analysis resulted in common themes that provided evidence for supporting the 
research questions stated.   
 
Falabella: Overview   
“We have come a long way since 1889 when Salvatore Falabella inaugurated the first large 
tailor’s shop in Chile. All of us at Falabella thank our shareholders, suppliers, customers, 
directors, management, as well as our collaborators and the business community for their 
contributions in making Falabella a regional leader” (Falabella Chairman at the 2007 
Annual Dinner of the Chamber of Commerce in Santiago, Chile, April 25th, 2007). 
 
The company owners consider Falabella’s leadership and brand recognition as a 
consequence of the company’s ability for synchronizing an excellent purchase experience in 
terms of exceeding customer’s expectations, service quality, and adaptation to the needs of 
customers, but most of all, on the excellent relationship with the business community and the 
high reputation of the Solari family. Falabella has a robust presence in Chile, Argentina, Peru, 
and Colombia, with 212 stores, 10 shopping centers, over 70,000 employees, 1.5 million 
square meters of floor space, more than 5 million active credit accounts (CMR), and 454 
financial centers. The company’s consolidated sales in 2008 were US$5,856 million, with an 
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increase of 21.3% compared to the previous year. Of the total sales, Chile represent 75.2%, 
Peru 18.4%, Argentina 6.6% and Colombia 2.5% (see Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 here 
Falabella participates in different retail sectors through department stores, home 
improvement stores, food retailing, shopping malls, real-estate agencies, financial services, 
insurance services, and travel agencies. The company has an integrated multi-format business 
model, supported by financial retail and the CMR credit card, which allows achieving synergies 
with regards to purchasing volumes and consumer information. In general, it targets middle and 
high income consumers with a variety of merchandise composed of apparel, household products, 
electronics, and furniture, and the company is an exclusive distributor of several national and 
international brands, and it has developed its own private label brands that attempt to offer a 
good value for price ratio. Falabella also participates in the real-estate and travel business by 
owning shopping centers and travel agencies in Chile and Peru.  
 
Company history: first 100 years 
The origins of Falabella date back to 1889, the year in which Salvatore Falabella, an Italian 
immigrant opened in Chile the first large fashion tailor shop for men located in the city center of 
Santiago, named Sastreria Falabella (Tailor shop Falabella). During the 19th century, several 
entrepreneurial immigrants from Italy, Great Britain, Germany and Croatia came to America, 
and became important pillars for industry growth and contributed to the development of the retail 
industry in Chile (Salazar and Pinto, 1999). It is estimated that approximately 10,000 Italian 
immigrants arrived to Chile between 1880 and 1930 (Pellegrini and Aprile, 1926). These 
immigrants consisted mainly of young men that left behind family, relatives, and friends with 
aspirations to become wealthy in the new continent (Memoria Chilena, 2004). They settled 
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mainly in urban cities such as Santiago and Valparaiso, and focused on industry and commercial 
activities. 
Salvatore Falabella left his natal town of Caserta in 1888 to look for new horizons in 
America (Torres Cautivo, 2000). His father owned a velvet manufacturing company in Italy, 
consequently the young Salvatore imported fine cashmeres and fabrics from the old continent to 
manufacture fashionable men’s suits with his own design (Memoria Chilena, 2004). A few years 
after his arrival, Salvatore married another Italian immigrant, Miss Finizio, and from this union 
they had 6 children, two of whom (Arnaldo and Roberto Falabella Finizzio) remained in charge 
of the family business. 
The distinguished politician and journalist Tancredo Pinochet LeBrun wrote in those years 
that “the family name is important among the elite society, as well as the family fortune, and the 
shop where they bought their apparel. A young man from a good family would have studied in a 
French or English school, and would have bought their clothing in Europe or at Falabella in 
Chile”  (Pinochet, 1909).When Salvatore died, the brothers renamed the store Gran Sastreria 
A&R Falabella and took over the management of the tailor shop during the 1920s and 1930s, 
with the goal of maintaining the high-quality shop image to attract wealthy consumers that 
desired international fashion styles. 
Arnaldo was predominantly the one in charge of the company. He had six children, four 
girls and two boys, but one of the boys died young and the other one was in charge of the 
industrial area but never worked in the store, so the issue of succession relied on the daughters. 
Over the years, Eliana, daughter of Arnaldo Falabella, married Alberto Solari Magnasco, a 
young man from an Italian immigrant family who had a wide vision and interest in the 
commercial activity. Alberto Solari was the eldest of 10 siblings and after suffering a heart 
stroke, Arnaldo realized that his son-in-law was the only one able to continue the family legacy 
(Torres Cautivo, 2000). As a result, he passed on his knowledge to Alberto, who took hold of the 
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company in 1937, and in the following years, with the support of the administrative manager 
Jorge Mellafe, he became President of the company and remained so until this death in 1986. 
According to Teresa, one of Alberto’s daughters, Eliana also had a good mind for business and 
Alberto always consulted her in his decisions (Torres Cautivo, 2000). 
With Alberto in charge, the family business initiated a growth process by incorporating new 
product lines such as fashion items, electronics and home wares. Alberto repositioned the tailor 
shop into a clothing store by incorporating new complementary products lines for men, such as 
shoes, hats, gloves, and shirts. Some of these products were imported from Europe. Furthermore, 
in 1940 Alberto made the assertive decision to incorporate imported women’s apparel locally 
manufactured but suing fashion styles from Europe and the United States. Falabella soon became 
a very successful business, and as a result of these changes, the company began to develop a 
strong brand name. Ultimately, in 1958, Falabella became a prestigious department store with 
eight stores and a vast array of home products and apparel. 
During the year 1962, the company initiated its national expansion by opening the first 
department store in Concepcion, the country’s second largest city. The glamour of Falabella 
grew steadily over the years and in 1971 had become the mandatory place to shop for the elite 
class of Chileans with the following advertisement: “Dress as you wish, but dress in 
Falabella…in one of the eight stores of Ahumada, the street of Falabella”. The perception of 
consumers at that time was that without having to leave the country, you could shop at Falabella 
and find the latest worldwide fashion styles, with authentic models from Paris, London, and New 
York. Although Falabella was very much a family business at that point in time, family members 
acknowledge that it was the team of Alberto Solari and Jorge Mellafe who starting thinking 
about the real transformation of Falabella from a tailor shop to a regional retailer. 
At the beginning of 1970, a mayor political turmoil impacted the country and companies 
were expropriated by the left-wing government of President Salvador Allende (Collier and Sater, 
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1996). During this period Falabella was seized by the state, but its loyal employees kept people 
from entering the premises and protected the merchandise from being taken until a change in 
government brought stability back to the country (Ampuero, 2005). Business was so bad, 
according to Juan Cuneo Solari who later became vice-president of the firm, that at times the 
employees passed the hours playing chess in the office “because there was nothing to sell”, as he 
mentioned in an interview for a business magazine (Ampuero, 2005).  
This period of instability, along with the death of Arnaldo Falabella, led some members of 
the Falabella family, such as the Falabella-Peragallo sisters (Eliana’s sisters), to sell their shares 
in the company. As a result, seventy-five percent of the company was acquired by a group 
comprising Reinaldo Solari Magnasco (brother of Alberto), Juan Cuneo Solari (nephew), Jorge 
Mellafe, Sergio Cardone Solari, and the Lombardi family. Reinaldo owned his own apparel 
business, Mavesa, for manufacturing women’s clothing. He also managed the Falabella store in 
Concepcion so had experience in the company ropes. During this period, an internal 
reorganization of the company allowed Juan Cuneo Solari, nephew of Alberto Solari, to acquire 
shares in the company, and this decision would have a huge impact in the future growth of the 
company. 
Juan Cuneo Solari became Falabella’s general manager in 1978 with the aim of modernizing 
and professionalizing the company. Cuneo was the driving force behind the ensuing expansion of 
the Falabella chain. His previous experience in the banking industry allowed the company to 
diversify into new sectors such as finance, insurance, real estate, and tourism. Furthermore, 
Cuneo was convinced that to succeed in business it was necessary to hire highly educated 
professionals and empower them. His management style included promotion and the formation 
of autonomous management teams which would be essential for the next phase of company 
professionalization.  
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Professionalization and Growth 
The year 1980 was to be a breakthrough year in Falabella’s history, as the company 
launched the first retail corporate credit card in the country, known as CMR, which grew to 
become the market leader in Chile. The idea to launch a corporate credit card emerged from 
examining Sears’ credit card business in the United States, but at the same time this needed 
adaptation to the local reality of Latin American consumers. The financial crisis had hit the Latin 
American region and consumers had less income and purchasing power. Through retail credit, 
lower-income consumers have had access to a wider assortment of quality products, as well as to 
different partnering businesses in gas, telecommunication, healthcare, photography, and fast 
food. This credit card also enabled Falabella to acquire valuable information about consumer 
purchasing behavior and to establish a customer loyalty program with points that result in 
discounts and free merchandise. CMR would become very important in Falabella’s 
internationalization process allowing consumers from all international markets to purchase 
merchandise from any of Falabella’s stores and alliance partner (EIU, 2004). 
In 1983, Juan Cuneo decided that the firm should move its 70 year old store from central 
Santiago to the recently vacated site of the Sears department store in the posh Parque Arauco 
shopping centre, located in the western suburban residential sector of the city (Ampuero, 2005). 
His decision was supported by Reinaldo Solari based on trends in the rest of the world, where 
people were living further away from the city centre and retailers had to follow them (Ampuero, 
2005). The American retailer Sears Reobuck had entered the Chilean market in 1981 and opened 
one store in Santiago in the Parque Arauco Shopping Center. The retailer didn’t perform well 
and withdrew from the market at the end of 1982 (Ampuero, 2008). Cuneo’s commitment to this 
move was so strong, he confessed that for the first time in his life he had used a sleeping bag and 
stayed overnight to make sure the store was finished on time because it had to be ready for 
opening in 30 days (Ampuero, 2008). The inauguration of this store along with the new 
 
 
18 
 
corporate credit card established a new business culture in the company, with a focus on market 
research, loyalty programs, and a better understanding of customer preferences. 
Meanwhile, two important Chilean competitors followed closely Falabella’s path. 
Almacenes Paris was founded in 1900 by the Galmez family as a furniture store, and by mid 
1950s had expanded its merchandise offering to include apparel, which resulted in a department 
store format. Ripley, on the other hand, started operations in 1964 as a clothing store and in 1985 
inaugurated its first department store, incorporating electronic products and house wares. Both 
family based retail firms were becoming strong competitors to Falabella in the department store 
business. Nevertheless, competition encouraged Falabella to innovate and to focus even more on 
consumer satisfaction. The company was always one step ahead and developed a permanent first 
mover advantage of satisfying consumers by anticipating consumer needs and preferences, 
remaining the leader in retail development domestically and internationally. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Falabella created an expansion plan comprised of four steps: 
internationalization, the development of the financial business area, real estate growth by means 
of malls, and the development of new retail areas. For this purpose, several key actions were 
taken by Falabella as the basis for future development and became embedded in the company’s 
business model. First, corporate governance was changed by establishing a board of directors 
separate from the management team that would guide the company. In addition, a technological 
orientation was considered essential for the future growth of the company so investments in 
equipment and technological systems were carried on permanently, and the company began to 
promote sales through the internet. Finally, a new focus on alliances with other companies 
following a win-win strategy for both partners was established as a way to provide a better 
service for customers. 
In the following years, Falabella also entered the real estate business by taking a stake in the 
Mall Plaza group, which is the largest shopping centre operator in Chile, and opened Mall Plaza 
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Vespucio, the first of several Santiago shopping centers catering to the middle class. This was 
the first Chilean mall that incorporated features such as a food court, a play area for children, and 
the country’s first multiplex cinema. Mall Plaza group later opened nine shopping centers in 
different cities in Chile, with Falabella holding a half-share in each. This business would become 
strategic for Falabella’s domestic and international growth strategy. 
 
Falabella’s Internationalization Process (1993-2009) 
“Falabella’s aim is to become the leading retail operator in Latin America, both in terms of 
presence as well as financial results, combing world-class management quality with 
commitment to local communities”(Falabella Chairman at the 2007 Annual Dinner of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Santiago, Chile, April 25th, 2007). 
 
In 1993, Falabella initiated its internationalization process with the opening of its first 
department store in Mendoza, Argentina, using a Greenfield strategy. The main goal of this 
process was to shift their focus to foreign markets within the region because of Chile’s relatively 
mature and saturated retail environment. From the beginning, Juan Cuneo aimed for Falabella to 
become a leader in the department-store business throughout the Latin American region. Thus, it 
needed to internationalize as soon as possible because large retailers such as Wal-Mart and 
Carrefour were already starting to look at expanding through the region and would compete with 
Falabella with apparel, electronics, and home products.  
Argentina 
Falabella entered the Argentinean market mainly because of geographic closeness and size 
of the market. Although the prestigious UK department store Harrods had operated its only 
South American store in Buenos Aires, Falabella was a pioneer in introducing the department 
store format to middle-income consumers in Argentina, and maintained the same merchandise 
assortment as in Chile due to the knowledge and experience in serving this group of people. 
Without properly researching the Argentinean marketplace, the large flow of tourists coming 
from Argentina (especially Mendoza) led the company to believe that there would be similar 
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consumer tastes and preferences in both countries. Only a few executive roles were held by 
Chilean executives who knew the company’s operations well, but most of the employees in 
Argentina were local. During the early 1990s, the Chilean peso was favorable to Argentineans 
due to the exchange rate between both currencies. This resulted in many Argentineans travelling 
to Chile for holiday purposes and led to shopping massively at Falabella. 
During the first few years, Falabella continued its expansion in this market, hoping to 
achieve economies of scale in order to make the business profitable. The company expanded 
opening stores in Rosario, Córdoba, San Juan and Buenos Aires. However, Falabella’s first 
international experience didn’t turn out as the company predicted, as sales were lower than 
expected. Falabella’s executives regretted having opened their first store in Mendoza instead of 
Buenos Aires, where sales volumes could be higher. Moreover, the environment that Falabella 
confronted in Argentina was different from the one in Chile. Legal norms, consumer preferences, 
and shopping habits were different and the difficulties of importing were also more pronounced 
than in Chile. As an example, Argentinean consumers frequently tried to avoid asking for the 
invoice when shopping at small stores to avoid paying the consumer taxes. 
Argentina is known as the capital of the fashion industry in Latin America and is considered 
as the fashion leader due to its European heritage and immigrants; thus, consumers preferred to 
shop at boutiques for clothes and hypermarkets for electronics. Market research conducted by 
Falabella in Argentina showed that Argentineans valued exclusivity in their apparel and avoided 
taking risks in finding others dressed in the same way. The majority of Falabella’s offering were 
focused on selling women’s clothes and the main competition for Falabella in this sector were 
specialized stores and boutiques. Hypermarkets were also competitors to Falabella for mass 
consumer items such as children clothing and electronics. Falabella did not have local knowledge 
and thus had trouble trying to understand local tastes. They made mistakes with the product and 
service assortment. For example, women didn’t like the style of their clothes and jeans, and the 
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size of the beds was too large. In addition, consumers were not used to shopping in department 
stores. They valued exclusivity and preferred to shop at boutiques or specialty stores. Thus, the 
first international experience of Falabella didn’t meet the initial expectations of the company in 
this market.   
Peru 
Realizing its mistakes in Argentina, the company entered the department store format in 
Peru in 1995 by acquiring 70 % of Sociedad Andina de Grandes Almaneces (SAGA). This 
company was formerly Sears, Roebuck & Co. The American retail chain had left the Peruvian 
market and had sold the stores to the Roca family group. The company owned two Saga 
department stores in Lima, and a third store located in the city centre of Lima was opened in 
1998. Saga had a strong brand image in the local market, and had a strong knowledge of the 
Peruvian consumer. It was perceived by consumers and the general business community as a 
legitimate Peruvian brand. Saga was owned by a very well-respected Peruvian family group, the 
Roca family, and the CEO and representative of the Roca family, Juan Xavier Roca Mendenhall, 
became general manager of Saga-Falabella. He holds a degree in Economics from Amherst 
College and a Masters of Business Administration degree from the Harvard University. 
The fact that Saga already had established retail stores in the marketplace, as well as local 
brand recognition and reputation and market understanding, facilitated the initial operation of 
Saga-Falabella in Peru and helped protect Falabella from nationalistic demonstrations by 
consumers due to a latent rivalry between both countries as a result of historical events dating 
back to the 19th century. Having a partner in Peru facilitated the market entry operations for 
Falabella executives; therefore they invested much effort in developing a trustworthy 
relationship with the Roca family. Falabella considered Saga as an excellent partner and Xavier 
Roca was perceived as very a professional executive. Overall, they felt that there was a good fit 
between the Roca and Falabella family groups. An interview with Juan Xavier Roca reflects his 
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opinion towards the relationship with Falabella. “Partnering with Falabella has been a wonderful 
experience! We get along very well. We have common objectives, and we have grown in a very 
satisfactory way. We have developed new business in Peru together with [the home improvement 
chain] Sodimac, and [the supermarket chain] Tottus, and we have always been treated like a real 
partner by Falabella”.  
In 1996, the company continued its national expansion in Peru by renovating one of the 
stores in Lima and inaugurating a new store in the same city at the end of that year. From the 
beginning, Saga-Falabella implemented the same processes and best practices from Falabella 
Chile, but maintained the local administration and employees of Saga. Falabella decided to 
standardize several elements of its international retail mix, such as the layout, design of stores, 
merchandise, quality of products, and private label brands. However, learning from the mistakes 
made in Argentina, Falabella adapted some elements of the retail mix that made the retail offer 
more appealing to the local consumer. For example, within the Deco-Home category, a 
significant portion of the textiles came from Brazil, Pakistan, or China. However, within the 
same category, the furniture was manufactured locally in each market due to the high transport 
cost of importing large volumes of large sized gear.  
Due to the strong need to fund its internationalization activities, Falabella became a publicly 
traded company in 1996, when it first sold shares on the Chilean stock market. One hundred 
million shares corresponding to 5% of the firm were traded and for the first time in the 
company’s history more than 2,700 employees became shareholders of the firm. During this 
year, the company also established the financial services affiliates, the real estate branch for their 
real estate projects, and the textile firms Italmod and Mavesa for increasing their capacity to 
manufacture apparel. A year later the company diversified its service offering by creating Viajes 
Falabella (travel business) and Seguros Falabella (insurance business), both supported by the 
credit card CMR.  
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Even though there were economic difficulties in Peru during 1997, it was an important year 
for Saga-Falabella because it widened its offering, created the travel agency, introduced the 
CMR card, and partnered with a local insurance company. The role of CMR was crucial for the 
internationalization of Falabella because consumers could use it in all of Falabella’s businesses 
helping improve sales, and also it allowed the company to establish an important link with 
customers by providing relevant information regarding their preferences for products and 
services. Similar to the Argentinean market, Falabella opened a distribution centre in Peru in 
1998, which allowed more efficiency in the logistics and sourcing of the stores. 
 
Challenges of Internationalization  
An important phase of Falabella’s internationalization process occurred in 1997, when the 
company decided to enter the home improvement business and engaged in a joint venture with 
the U.S. retailer Home Depot to operate home improvement stores in Chile. At that time, Home 
Depot was the world’s largest home improvement retailer, selling a broad assortment of 
merchandise at competitive prices. Home Depot had been ranked by Fortune magazine as 
America’s Most Admired Specialty Retailer (Marcus and Blank, 2001), so Falabella felt that it 
was a wonderful opportunity to partner with a knowledgeable and prestigious retailer. The 
owners thought that partnering with Home Depot provided them with knowledge on the home 
improvement industry as well as financial resources and brand reputation. 
The first Home Depot store outside of North America opened in Santiago in August 1998, 
with 400 Chilean employees denominates ‘associates’ by the company. The President of Chile 
and his wife attended the opening and thousands of consumers visited the store during the first 
months (Marcus and Blank, 2001). Home Depot implemented a standardized version of its retail 
format in Chile because it had worked well in the US and Canada. The owners believed that no 
adaptation to their retail format was necessary and that Home Depot would soon dominate the 
 
 
24 
 
Chilean market because of its low prices and excellent service quality (Marcus and Blank, 2001). 
A second Home Depot store opened in December 1998, and by the end of 2000 Home Depot 
operated five stores in Chile, four in Santiago, and one in Concepcion. 
The following year, a strong financial crisis hit the Latin American region, which led 
Falabella to improve its processes and make the necessary changes to confront this crisis. In 
Chile, the company emphasized more affordable apparel and house ware merchandise offerings 
which led to the development of several private label brands in electronics, apparel, and home 
wares. These changes in the retail merchandise helped the company survive the crisis and defend 
its leadership in each market. In addition, through the license of ING Bank, Banco Falabella, the 
financial business, was launched with small offices within the stores and offered consumers 
credit in the form of mortgages and auto loans. A year later, Falabella started its online sales in 
Chile and acquired 20% of Farmacias Ahumada (FASA), the largest drugstore chain in Chile. 
The associations with Home Depot and FASA gave CMR cardholders access to credit at these 
chains. In turn, Falabella began selling the latter’s cosmetics and personal care products in its 
own stores. The company also acquired Textil Viña Ltda., a textile manufacturer located outside 
of Santiago, with the intent to increase its manufacturing capacity.  
In 2001, there was a slow reactivation of the Chilean economy, which led Falabella to look 
internally to the Chilean market and improve its processes. In a poor year for Chilean business, 
Falabella excelled and maintained its position as the largest department store chain in Chile, with 
43 percent of market share. The company decided to strengthen the construction, property 
business and home improvement format in Chile. Falabella continued professionalizing the 
company by incorporating modern technology, providing a wider product range, opening local 
distribution centers, improving customer service, improving customer service, developing loyalty 
programs and credit cards for consumers, and engaging in strong national expansion. The 
company also opened an office in Shanghai to achieve closeness and better purchase conditions 
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with Chinese suppliers. The same year, Falabella Viajes became the travel agency with the 
largest extension in Chile, and was located among the top four agencies in the country. Based on 
the company’s achievement and trajectory in the marketing area, Falabella was inducted into the 
Marketing Hall of Fame Chile, which distinguishes the most exceptional brands in Chile. 
Although the Chilean market was showing signs of improvement, Peru and Argentina were 
immersed in their own local crises, which motivated the company to make some changes to 
consolidate its international presence. In Peru there were many difficulties to overcome, such as 
political turbulence, economic recession, and the entry of the Chilean competitor Ripley. To 
adjust to this crisis, in 2001Falabella decided to launch the Express format, a smaller version of 
their department store format. In Argentina, a strong financial crisis hit and consumer spending 
dropped. Instead of withdrawing from the market, the company decided to make structural and 
strategic changes to their merchandise assortment and sourcing before continuing expanding in 
the market. Efforts were concentrated in commercialization and optimization of its logistic and 
store operations rather than opening new stores. To become more competitive in this market, 
Falabella incorporated more local brands and renovated product lines by improving their quality 
to satisfy the needs of more demanding consumers. 
In the meantime, it was becoming increasingly obvious to Falabella that the Home Depot 
venture was not delivering the expected results. According to news press articles, Home Depot 
Chile only reached 3% of market share (Mercurio, 2001).The earliest trouble came from 
significant differences between Home Depot and Falabella executives as to how to run the 
business in Chile. Much of the failure and losses of Home Depot Chile was due to the 
unwillingness of the American retailer to listen to Falabella’s suggestions for improvement 
(Bianchi & Ostale, 2006). The American executives in charge of Home Depot’s operation in 
Chile were considered indifferent to Falabella´s suggestions to adapt the retail format to local 
preferences. At the end of 2001, when faced with continuous losses, Home Depot decided to 
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leave the Chilean market. Although Home Depot never disclosed publicly its financial losses, 
Falabella mentioned in a press conference that during the first half of 2001 Home Depot Chile 
had losses of over US$1.2 million (Mercurio, 2001). Before the end of that year, Falabella 
bought out Home Depot’s two-thirds interest in the Chilean operation for approximately US$50 
million, also assuming its debts. In spite of the failed venture with Home Depot, Falabella 
learned much from this experience regarding logistics, technology, customer service, and 
merchandising. Falabella soon reversed three years of losses under a new brand name: Home 
Store. This brand was developed by a Chilean advertising agency to resemble the Home Depot 
brand. The company saw this chain as the vehicle it lacked to continue growing retail sales and 
made plans to invest for the construction of new outlets.  
 
Becoming a Multi-Format Retailer 
The year 2002 strengthened the internationalization process of Falabella. The company 
introduced the CMR credit card in Argentina and in addition decided to expand and enter the 
food retail business by inaugurating the first Tottus hypermarket in Lima. The company realized 
that the Peruvian market was underdeveloped in the food retail sector and viewed this as an 
opportunity to gain a larger market share in Peru. Moreover, the Peruvian market was perceived 
as a low risk market in case the format did not work out as planned because it would not affect 
Falabella in it domestic market where it was market leader. Two more stores were opened in 
2003 and 2004 in the affluent districts San Isidro and San Miguel.  
Another important step for Falabella’s internationalization process came about as a result of 
the company’s interest in having a larger share of the home improvement business. With only a 
few existing stores, Falabella’s market share in this sector was much smaller than that of the 
leader, Sodimac S.A., which had 51 stores in Chile (and 6 in Colombia). After extended 
negotiations, in 2003 Falabella decided to merge with Sodimac, which was at the time the largest 
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home improvement retailer in Latin America with operations in Chile and Colombia (EIU, 
2003). Sodimac was created by a group of construction firms for supply purposes in 1952. 
During the next thirty years, Sodimac became the main distributor of materials for construction 
in Chile. The industry at this time was composed of many small stores called ferreterias, which 
sold construction materials, tools, and accessories for home maintenance to professionals and 
constructors, but not to home owners or general public. In 1982, Sodimac was bought by 
Empresas Dersa (Del Rio Family group), and stores were re-oriented towards a new format in the 
market, Home Center, which offered products and services for home improvement to end 
consumers and constructors. 
Falabella issued to Sodimac’s owners (the family group Del Rio) new shares of its stock 
valued at US$550 million for 80% of the company and paying cash for the remainder (EIU, 
2003). This group was lead by Jose Luis del Rio, civil engineer, and CEO of Sodimac. As a 
result of the acquisition, the brand Home Store was eliminated and Home Centre became the 
brand of home improvement stores for Falabella. After the deal was confirmed, the parties spoke 
enthusiastically about extending Falabella's international reach. Thus, this merger not only 
consolidated Falabella in the home improvement business but also boosted the 
internationalization process of the company. At this point, Falabella was owned by three family 
groups: Solari, Cuneo, and Del Rio. According to an interview to Juan Cuneo, the merging of 
both sets family groups was beneficial for Falabella because it allowed the firm to open to new 
ideas and to a new team of professional executives (Ampuero, 2005).  
During 2004, the company introduced its home improvement format in the Peruvian market, 
inaugurating the first Sodimac store in Lima. During its first year of operation, this home 
improvement format showed good results, confirming its acceptance among Peruvian consumers. 
At the same time, benefiting from the knowledge obtained through Tottus in Peru, Falabella 
decided to enter the food retail business in Chile and acquired 88% of San Francisco from the 
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Leyton family group, the third largest food retail chain in Chile.  Francisco Leyton was the 
previous CEO and owner of the San Francisco chain, and after the acquisition he remained as 
such. During that same year, Pablo Turner, the prestigious general manager of Falabella, caused 
a stir when he left the company after 21 years to join one of its closest rivals in the department 
store sector, Almacenes Paris. He was succeeded by Juan Benavides who was at the time the 
general manager of the credit card business, and who still remained as CEO of Falabella in 2009.  
During 2005, local competition strengthened in Chile. Falabella’s competitor Cencosud, 
acquired the department store chain Paris from the Galmez family group and became an 
imminent threat to the company due to its multi-format model. As a result of this competitor’s 
action, Falabella decided to retaliate and increase its food retailing business, so it opened its first 
hypermarket Tottus store in Chile. At that point, Falabella was starting to realize that the key to 
succeed in its internationalization process was to operate integrally as a multi-format retailer in 
every market.  
The integrated multi-format retailing model is shown in Figure 1. This model suggests that 
by operating different retail formats such as department stores, home improvement stores, and 
grocery stores, the company can achieve economies of scale in purchasing, distribution, 
marketing, and with the implementation of private label brands. Furthermore, the financial and 
real estate businesses ties it binds it all together because it provides customers with credit to 
purchase goods and services from these retail formats. Overall, the model acts as a virtual cycle 
for obtaining synergies from purchases and customer intelligence to support further international 
growth.    
Insert Figure 1 here 
Colombia 
Colombia was an attractive market for Falabella since it is a country with more than 40 
million habitants and several cities had more than two million residents, which is critical for the 
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retail business. Sodimac had been operating in Colombia since 1995 through a 49%/51% joint 
venture with the Colombian family conglomerate Corona. Similar to Saga, the family group 
Corona was highly respected and legitimate, with over 125 years of operations in Colombia. Its 
core activity is the production and distribution of construction materials and home-improvement 
products. The group exports to more than 25 countries, the United States being its main market.  
During 2004 and 2005, three Sodimac stores were opened in Barranquilla, Pereira, and El 
Dorado, and became the most important home improvement retailer in the market. In October 
2005, the company introduced CMR in Colombia and by the end of the year the company 
increased its participation in the joint venture with the Corona group from 35% to 49%. Thus, 
even before opening their first department store in Colombia, Falabella had already introduced 
the financial business, insurance and travel services. 
In November 2006, the first Falabella department store was inaugurated in the Santa Fe 
shopping centre located in Bogota, which is one of the most modern in Colombia with an 
excellent location and large spaces. The newly-appointed country manager was the previous 
Peruvian country manager and had already been living in Colombia for six months. He 
recognized several challenges for the department store format in the Colombian market while he 
was living there. It became evident for him that this market was different from Peru and Chile, 
but more similar to Argentina in fashion trends and purchase behavior, but with a strong base of 
local suppliers. The main competitors for Falabella department store in Colombia were 
specialized boutiques and local tailor shops, as well as local and international supermarkets.  
In Colombia, Falabella top managers decided to modify their merchandise offer with a mix 
of 50% apparel and 50% in electronics and home ware. This decision was made because the 
electronics business was less developed in this market. Electronic products could only be found 
at hypermarkets and some specialized stores, so the company decided to widen their merchandise 
offerings. Colombia as a textile manufacturer offered many opportunities to Falabella in terms of 
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suppliers for all four international markets, since some Colombian suppliers have been in 
Falabella’s stores for many years. Falabella incorporated local brands within the stores, such as 
the coffee giant Juan Valdez. Private label brands from Chile and Peru were incorporated 
alongside local brands due to the nationalistic characteristics of Colombians which was seen in 
strong consumer preferences for local brands. Introducing CMR was a challenge for Falabella 
due to the lack of financial information and high levels of informal credit with high rates. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2007 Falabella had opened 400,000 accounts.  
 
Consolidation 
Opening department stores in Colombia consolidated Falabella as a regional integrated 
multi-format retailer, and encouraged the company to continue investing in the region to 
expand their retail formats. The company also decided to engage in organizational changes to 
increase synergies and expand brands in all of the markets to reinforce its integrated multi-
format business model. This led Falabella to make a very important bid in 2007 to acquire 
D&S, the largest food retail chain in Chile, in an attempt to strengthen its food retail format 
and become the second-largest retailer in Latin America (after Wal-Mart in Mexico). This 
merger could have created South America’s biggest retailer. However, the Chilean Anti-Trust 
Tribunal hesitated and did not allow the merger to avoid monopolistic power (Vargas, 2008).  
Although disappointed with the outcome, the company continued its consolidation stage as 
a regional retailer by investing in their integrated business model that allowed achieving 
synergies with regards to purchasing and importing volumes, and customer service. At this 
point in time, Falabella was able to offer similar products and the same credit card in all its 
retail formats and markets. The corporation had implemented a matrix organizational structure 
(employees reported directly to country managers and division managers), which allowed 
information sharing among country and division managers in Peru, Argentina or Colombia. 
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The engine behind this accelerated international development was a group of highly qualified 
country managers that shared the best practices in all four markets, although the rest of the 
management team was local. Country managers had the role of communicating to achieve 
synergy among all businesses, which was the essence of the integrated business model. 
Falabella also placed strong emphasis on making this conglomerate efficient and competitive 
by improving stock control processes, technology to have a customized offering in each store, 
stronger development of private label brands, and certification on sustainability. The company 
also developed relationships and links with regional trade associations and professional bodies 
in each market which provided Falabella with regional market intelligence. 
As a result of the consolidation in all four markets, in 2008, the company received several 
recognitions. Tottus, Saga-Falabella, and Sodimac were chosen by the Great Place to Work 
Institute among the ten best places to work in Peru (GPWI, 2008). Falabella was also 
incorporated into the Boston Consulting Group’s list of 100 global companies from emerging 
markets capable of competing with multinationals from developed markets (BCG, 2009). In 
addition, Sodimac was acknowledged as a brand with a high reputation among Chilean 
consumers, and in 2008 published its first sustainability report, becoming one of the first 
retailers in Latin America aligned with the requirements of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
which implied revealing and systematize a series of good practices in the global business 
model. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a large multi-stakeholder governed institution 
collaborating to provide the global standards in sustainability reporting. Overall, the company 
had grown in sales and number of stores (see Table 2) to become a regional multi-format and 
financial retail conglomerate.   
Insert Table 2 here 
Falabella had in effect come a long way since 1889 when Salvatore Falabella inaugurated 
the first tailor’s shop in Chile. Nevertheless, several challenges lay ahead in Falabella’s 
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internationalization journey. Chilean strong competitor Cencosud had become an aggressive 
multi-format retailer, and was also attempting to become one of the largest retailers in Latin 
America. During 2007, this company started operations in Colombia, Brazil, and Peru, engaging 
in joint ventures and acquisitions with local chains. Strong competition has led both companies 
to be located in the top five retailers of the Latin American region in 2008 (Deloitte, 2009). In 
addition, a strong recession has started worldwide, which has shown to strongly affect retail sales 
in every country. However, Falabella announced that slower economic growth was not affecting 
their investment plans in the long run (2009-2012), and projections of becoming the largest 
retailer in the Latin American region (Wall Street Journal, 2008).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The previous narrative of Falabella’s growth and internationalization illustrates how a 
retailer from an emerging market was capable of becoming leader in the domestic market and an 
important player in Latin America. Drawing on the literature on retail internationalization and 
the theoretical perspectives of institutional theory, this case provides insights into how a retailer 
from a Latin America expanded internationally and has been able to compete with large retailers 
from developed markets.  
 
How do Chilean retailers internationalize compared to retailers from developed markets? 
The previous narrative shows that Falabella’s internationalization process followed initially 
a stages approach to internationalization. Initially the company started operations in a 
neighboring country, Argentina, where it expanded gradually by learning and committing 
resources to internationalization. After learning from its mistakes in Argentina, the company 
entered another neighboring country, Peru, through the acquisition of a local retail chain, 
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which implies higher levels of economic and managerial commitment. As the company gained 
more experience in the marketplace, Falabella grew in these markets by introducing new retail 
formats, such as supermarket and home improvement stores (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). This is consistent with other studies conducted in Asian countries 
on emerging market internationalization, which find that emerging market firms tend to invest 
in less developed and geographically proximate countries (Lall, 1983; London and Hart, 2004).  
Moreover, the data from the case study also suggests that in later years, Falabella continued 
with an eclectic approach to internationalization (Dunning, 1981). The company’s latest 
international expansion was Colombia, a more distant market and the decision to 
internationalize was based mostly on the company´s ownership and location advantages. 
Falabella has acquired managerial and firm skills to manage an international operation and 
adapt accordingly to the market as well as location advantages due to the opportunity of 
foreign market. This is similar to  
Further, the data from the case study suggests that Falabella’s internationalization strategy 
included engaging in networks and partnerships that enabled them to catch up with more 
resourceful players from developed markets (Bonaglia et al., 2007). This was necessary to 
draw resources and learning from domestic and international partners to build the capabilities 
to operate internationally (Yiu et al., 2005; Yiu et al., 2007a; Elango and Pattnaik, 2007). In 
addition, Falabella faced a lower knowledge gap compared to retailers from developed 
countries when operating in these Latin American markets, because these new contexts 
presented a similar economic and institutional environment to the domestic context.  
 
Why are these retail firms successful internationally?  
Although emerging market firms face financial and technological resource scarcities due to the 
lower level of development in their home countries compared with developed nations, 
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according to the data, Falabella acquired specific assets and skills to compete internationally. 
Drawing on institutional theory, Falabella’s international competitive advantage is associated 
to the firm’s ability to achieve legitimacy in every market it operates by conforming to the 
institutional norms of the market. Belonging to a family conglomerate, engaging in networks 
and partnerships, organizational learning, and having an experienced management team helped 
Falabella gain legitimacy in all its international markets.  
Networks with home and foreign actors helped Falabella identify and the salient norms of 
each market. Ties with regulatory agents, banks, trade associations, universities, and financial 
institutions provided this retailer with access to critical resources and information regarding 
regulations and policies, international data, and market opportunities. Moreover, links with 
regional trade associations and professional bodies provided Falabella with market intelligence. 
Engaging with local partners in Peru and Colombia allowed Falabella to adopt an appropriate 
business style in each market and avoid problems with nationalistic feelings from host 
consumers. For example, in Peru they entered through the acquisition of the local chain Saga and 
operated in this market under the name Saga-Falabella. The fact that Saga had already 
established retail stores, as well as local brand recognition, reputation and market understanding, 
facilitated the operation of Falabella in Peru and protected Falabella from nationalistic 
demonstrations by consumers due to a latent rivalry between both countries as a result of 
historical wars dating back to the 19th century. Similarly, in Colombia the family conglomerate 
Corona was highly respected and legitimate and thus helped Falabella introduce the credit card 
CMR to the market prior to the opening of its first department store in 2006. Thus, firms from 
emerging markets can draw on the international experience of their parental and foreign 
networks to operate internationally. 
Further, the company is owned by the Solari family, a well known conglomerate in Chile 
and in the Latin American region with well-established distribution network. Belonging to a 
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family conglomerate with so many years in the marketplace has helped Falabella achieve several 
advantages over foreign companies from developed markets, and made the firm legitimate in the 
eyes of other emerging-market-relevant actors due to the reputation and tradition provided by the 
family name. The company exhibits strong shared values rooted in the founder’s vision and 
legacy and a deep understanding of the local market and customers. Additionally, Falabella 
engaged in diverse ownership of established retail and manufacturing businesses. Top executives 
well known by the community, and are highly regarded as experienced executives. In fact, in 
2007 Falabella was chosen as one of the best-managed companies in Latin America (Euromoney, 
2007). Overall, the data suggests that family groups are substitutes for imperfect market 
institutions in emerging economies and facilitate legitimacy in emerging economies (Martínez et 
al., 2007). 
In addition, Falabella went through a learning process that included not only expanding 
abroad but also learning from its own domestic experience of opening stores across the country. 
Likewise, Falabella managers learned from their own international mistakes. Falabella’s initial 
attempt to operate in Argentina did not go as expected. Based on the experience in the 
Argentinean market, the company made a considerable effort to understand the host marketplace 
and consumer preferences better before entering the Peruvian and Colombian markets. This 
supports previous research on retail organizational learning that argues that increased 
performance is more likely for companies that learn as much as possible from their foreign 
operations and from their mistakes to conform to the relevant institutional norms (Palmer and 
Quinn, 2005). A main theme that arises from this study is the fact that Falabella also learned a 
great amount from being exposed to mistakes from foreign retailers that operated in Chile. In 
particular, due to the close relationship with Home Depot, Falabella learned about best practices, 
service and training, and technology. This allowed the company to improve its operations abroad 
by applying the best practices of foreign retailers but at the same time adapting the necessary 
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elements of the retail mix.  As one manager mentioned, “The arrival of Home Depot was the best 
thing that could have happened to us, it made us a better company”. 
Furthermore, Falabella’s managers were highly professional and internationally experienced 
on how to operate in other emerging economies and the adaptations needed in the overall 
strategy. Managerial competencies were reflected in human resource management, the 
effectiveness of information flow, coordination, organizational structure, and international 
experience. According to competitors and the business community, Falabella managers are one 
of the most valuable assets of the company. These highly-qualified executives with postgraduate 
degrees had a profound knowledge of the industry and remained in the firm longer than the 
industry average. Thus, these executives had strong managerial know-how to operate in 
emerging economies. Furthermore, the fact that the company encouraged the hiring of local 
management in each international market again allowed the company to be perceived as 
legitimate among suppliers, competitors, and the general business community, even though there 
were nationalistic barriers within these markets.  
In conclusion, overtime Falabella acquired specific knowledge on how to operate 
successfully in other emerging markets. The company had the capability to research and 
understand well each international market and was able to standardize several elements of the 
retail mix across markets, such as the layout and decoration of stores, the communication 
strategy and management practices, to achieve a standardized market position focusing on 
middle-income consumers and create important synergies among different business areas. 
Falabella hired as many local employees as possible, but the country director was always Chilean 
with many years of experience in the company. These findings are consistent with previous 
literature in international business, which suggests that emerging market firms possess marketing 
knowledge that might be unavailable to firms from developed countries since their strategies 
consider lower economic development (Sinha, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). This is an important 
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contribution to the international retailing discipline and helps explain why retailers from 
developed countries fail in emerging markets (Bianchi and Ostale, 2006).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Following several calls for research in emerging markets as a way to advance science 
(Wright et al., 2005; Burgess and Steenkamp, 2006), the aim of this exploratory study was to 
examine the growth and internationalization process of a retailer from an emerging country. This 
narrative of Falabella’s domestic growth and regional internationalization process shows that 
international success depends on how well a retailer from an emerging market conforms to the 
salient institutional norms in each country in which it operates in order to obtain legitimacy from 
relevant social actors. In other words, how a retail firm develops strategic isomorphism of best 
practices in each international market.  
Most of the environmental factors mentioned in the international literature as barriers that 
international firms encounter when expanding abroad, were reflected in the institutional norms of 
retailing. For example, host government laws, cultural factors, competitive factors and social 
elements were all reflected in the institutional norms of each country, because they had to 
operate in a new environment with different salient norms that were sometimes difficult to 
perceive. These findings support the notion that retail firms may be very successful in their home 
markets, but they must also acknowledge the environmental differences and the barriers that can 
exist in a new market, especially those related to the cultural and social environment. 
Managers that participate in the internationalization process should be aware that differences 
exist among countries, even between geographically close countries such as the U.S., Mexico 
and Canada. The main issue for international retail managers is that they must adapt their retail 
practices and formats to fit the needs and expectations of host consumers, suppliers, employees, 
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families, and business community. They must make modifications to their retail concept in such 
a way that they still maintain their source of competitive advantage. The main objective 
therefore, is to implement this source of advantage effectively and gain legitimacy from all key 
social actors. In conclusion, international retailers from developed countries should not assume 
that their format would necessarily be successful in foreign markets. The level of saliency of the 
institutional norms and the strength of local competitors are both important to consider when 
deciding on the international retail strategy.  
Finally, the case study of Falabella suggests that the top managers of the domestic 
headquarters must be committed, and flexible to adaptation during the whole internationalization 
process, and not only prior to entering the market. This is a continuous and dynamic process, and 
does not finish once the retailer is already operating in a new market. On the contrary, this period 
is when retail executives must be most alert and committed to this endeavor. Future research 
should examine the managerial characteristics of international retailers necessary to increase the 
likelihood of success in foreign markets. 
The growth and international expansion of retailers from emerging countries is in its early 
stages of development and future research is recommended to investigate the experience of other 
emerging markets retailers to identify aspects that are new and unique to emerging market firms. 
Thus, the themes identified in the data should be explored in more depth with different samples 
and retail formats, in order to develop broader theoretical frameworks of retail 
internationalization. Additionally, this study is based on a single case, which limits its 
generalizability. Several of the themes identified in the data should be explored in more depth 
and quantitatively with different industry sectors. This will provide important insights for 
developing broader and more generalizable theoretical frameworks of emerging market retail 
internationalization. 
 
 
39 
 
References 
 
 
Alexander, N. (1997) International Retailing, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Alexander, N. & Doherty, A. M. (2010), "International retail research: focus, methodology 
and conceptual development". International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management, 38, 928-942. 
Alexander, N. & Myers, H. (2000), "The retail internationalisation process". International 
Marketing Review, 17, 334. 
Alexander, N. & Quinn, B. (2002), "International retail divestment". International Journal of 
Retail & Distribution Management, 30, 112. 
Ampuero, L. (2005) Juan Cúneo: El padre del retail. Revista Que Pasa. Santiago, Chile, 
Consorcio Periodístico de Chile S.A. . 
Ampuero, L. (2008) Los 24 grupos empresariales más relevantes de Chile. Revista Que Pasa. 
Santiago. 
Arbix, G. (2010), "Structural change and the emergence of the Brazilian MNEs". 
International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5, 266. 
Arnold, D. J. & Quelch, J. A. (1998), "New Strategies in Emerging Markets". Sloan 
Management Review, 40, 7. 
Arnold, S. J. (2002), "Lessons learned from the world's best retailers". International Journal 
of Retail & Distribution Management, 30, 562. 
Bcg (2009) 2009 BCG 100 new Global Challengers. 
http://www.bcg.com/impact_expertise/publications/files/The_2009_BCG_100_New_
Global_Challeng009.pdf. 
Bianchi, C. & Ostale, E. (2006), "Lessons learned from unsuccessful internationalization 
attempts: Examples of multinational retailers in Chile". Journal of Business Research, 
59, 140-147. 
Brenes, E. R. (2000), "Strategies for Globalizing Latin American Business". Journal of 
Business Research, 50, 3-7. 
Cavusgil, S. T. (1980), "On the internationalization process of the firms". European 
Research, 8, 273-281. 
Cohen, L. (1996), "From town to shopping center: the reconfiguration of consumer 
marketplaces in postwar America". American Historical Review, 101, 1050-81. 
Collier, S. & Sater, W. F. (1996) A History of Chile, 1808-1994, UK, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Cyrino, A. B., Barcellos, E. P. & Tanure, B. (2010), "International trajectories of Brazilian 
companies". International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5, 358. 
Dawson, J. A. (1994), "Internationalization of Retailing Operations.". Journal of Marketing 
Management, 10, 267-282. 
Deloitte (2009) Global Powers of Retailing. 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_globalpowersretailing.pdf. 
Dimaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1983), "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Reality in Organizational Fields". American Sociological 
Review, 48, 147-160. 
Doherty, A. M. (2009), "Market and partner selection processes in international retail 
franchising". Journal of Business Research, 62, 528-534. 
Dunning, J. H. (1981) International Production and the Multinational Enterprise, London, 
Allen and Unwin. 
Dunning, J. H. (1988), "The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and 
some possible extensions". Journal of International Business Studies, 19, 1-25. 
 
 
40 
 
Eiu (2003), "Chile industry: New retail giant". EIU ViewsWire. 
Eiu (2004), "Chile finance: Banks and retailers battle for credit-card users". EIU ViewsWire. 
Elango, B. & Pattnaik, C. (2007), "Building capabilities for international operations through 
networks: a study of Indian firms". Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 541. 
Estrategia (2010) Falabella y Cencosud entre los Retailers con Mayores Ganancias de la 
Region. Estrategia On line. Santiago. 
Euromoney (2007) The Best Managed Companies in Latin America. Euromoney institutional 
investor. 
Evans, J., Bridson, K., Byrom, J. & Medway, D. (2008), "Revisiting retail 
internationalisation". International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 36, 
260. 
Fernie, J. (1992), "Distribution Strategies of European Retailers". European Journal of 
Marketing, 26, 35-47. 
Gaur, A. & Kumar, V. (2010), "Internationalization of Emerging Market Firms: A Case for 
Theoretical Extension". Advances in International Management, 23, 603-627. 
Gaur, A. S., Kumar, V. & Sarathy, R. (2011) Liability of foreignness and internationalization 
of emerging market firms. IN ASMUSSEN, C., DEVINNEY, T.M., PEDERSEN, T. 
& TIHANYI, L. (EDS). ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT-
DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION: LOCATION SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES OR 
LIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS?, VOL. 24, NEW YORK: EMERALD. (Ed.) 
Golder, P. N. (2000), "Historical method in Marketing Research with new Evidence on Long 
Term Market Share Stability". Journal of Marketing Research, 37, 156-172. 
Gpwi (2008) Los Mejores Para Trabajar en Peru. IN INSTITUTE, G. P. T. W. (Ed.) 
http://www.greatplacetowork.com.pe. Lima. 
Gripsrud, G. & Benito, G. R. G. (2005), "Internationalization in retailing: modeling the 
pattern of foreign market entry". Journal of Business Research, 58, 1672. 
Guillen, M. F. (2000), "Business groups in emerging economies: A resource-based view". 
Academy of Management Journal, 43, 362. 
Hollander, S. C. (1970) Multinational Retailing, Michigan: Michigan State University. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M. & Wright, M. (2000), "Strategy in emerging 
economies". Academy of Management Journal, 43, 249-267. 
Johanson, J. & Mattsson, M. G. (1988) Internationalization in industrial systems: a network 
approach, New York, Croom Helm. 
Johanson, J. & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977), "The internationalization process of the firm--A model 
of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments". Journal of 
International Business Studies  (pre-1986), 8, 23-32. 
Johanson, J. & Vahlne, J.-E. (1990), "The Mechanism of Internationalisation". International 
Marketing Review, 7, 11-24. 
Kim, D., Kandemir, D. & Cavusgil, S. T. (2004), "The Role of Family Conglomerates in 
Emerging Markets: What Western Companies Should Know". Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 46, 13. 
Lall, S. (1983) The New Multinationals: The Spread of Third World Enterprises, New York, 
Wiley. 
London, T. & Hart, S. L. (2004), "Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: beyond the 
transnational model". Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 350. 
Lowe, M. & Wrigley, N. (2009), "Innovation in retail internationalisation: Tesco in the 
USA". The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 19, 
331. 
 
 
41 
 
Lu, Y., Zhou, L., Bruton, G. & Li, W. (2010), "Capabilities as a mediator linking resources 
and the international performance of entrepreneurial firms in an emerging economy". 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 419. 
Luo, Y. & Peng, M. W. (1999), "Learning to compete in a transition economy: Experience, 
environment, and performance". Journal of International Business Studies, 30, 269. 
Luo, Y. & Tung, R. (2007), "International Expansion of Emerging Market Enterprises: A 
Springboard Perspective". Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 481-498. 
Marcus, B. & Blank, A. (2001) Built from Scratch: How a Couple of Regular Guys Grew the 
Home Depot from Nothing to $30 Million, Atlanta, Crown Publishing Group. 
Martínez, J. I., Stöhr, B. S. & Quiroga, B. F. (2007), "Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence From Public Companies in Chile". Family Business Review, 
20, 83. 
Mathews, J. A. (2006), "Dragon Multinationals: New Players in the 21st Century of 
Globalization". Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23, 5-27. 
Mccracken, G. (1988) The Long Interview, N.Y, Sage Publications. 
Memoriachilena (2004) Memoria Chilena. Santiago, 
http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/index.asp?id_ut=inmigracionitalianaachile:1880
-1930. 
Mercurio, E. (2001) La Batalla que Viene. Diario El Mercurio. Santiago, Emol. 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1977), "Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth 
and ceremony". American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-63. 
Palmer, M. & Quinn, B. (2005), "An Exploratory Framework for Analysing International 
Retail Learning". The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer 
Research, 15, 27. 
Palmer, M. & Quinn, B. (2007), "The nature of international retail divestment: insights from 
Ahold". International Marketing Review, 24, 26. 
Pellegrini, A. & Aprile, J. C. (1926) Imigracion Italiana a Chile: Resumen General de las 
Actividades de la Colonia. El censo Comercial Industrial de la Colonia Italiana en 
Chile. Santiago, Pellegrini & Aprile. 
Perry, C. (1998), "Processes of a Case Study Methodology for Post Graduate Research in 
Marketing". European Journal of Marketing, 32, 785. 
Pinochet, T. L. (1909) La Conquista de Chile en el Siglo XX, Santiago, La Illustracion. 
Salazar, G. & Pinto, J. (1999) Historia Contemporanea de Chile II: Actores, Identidad y 
Movimiento, Santiago, LOM Ediciones. 
Scott, R. W. (1987), "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory". Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 32, 493-511. 
Singh, G., Pathak, R. D. & Naz, R. (2010), "Issues faced by SMEs in the internationalization 
process: results from Fiji and Samoa". International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5, 
153. 
Sinha, J. (2005), "Global champions from emerging markets". The McKinsey Quarterly, 26. 
Sparks, L. (2000), "Seven-Eleven Japan and The Southland Corporation: a marriage of 
convenience?". International Marketing Review, 17, 401. 
Spiggle, S. (1994), "Analysis and Interpretation of Qualitative Data in Consumer Research". 
Journal of Consumer Research, 21, 491-503. 
Stanger, H. (2010), "Failing at retailing: the decline of the Larkin Company, 1918-1942". 
Journal of Historical Research in Marketing, 2, 9-40. 
Sternquist, B. (1997), "International expansion of US retailers". International Journal of 
Retail & Distribution Management, 25, 262. 
 
 
42 
 
Swoboda, B., Schwarz, S. & Hälsig, F. (2007), "Towards a conceptual model of country 
market selection: Selection processes of retailers and C&C wholesalers". The 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 17, 253. 
Torres Cautivo, X. (2000) Las Solari Falabella: hermanas de fina sangre. El Mercurio. 
Santiago. 
Treadgold, A. (1991), "Dixons and Laura Ashley: Different Routes to International Growth". 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 19, 13. 
Tsai, H.-T. & Eisingerich, A. B. (2010), "Internalization Strategies Of Emerging Markets 
Firms". California Management Review, 53, 114. 
Vargas, M. (2008) Chile Retailer Falabella 2007 Net Up 2.5 Percent. Reuters UK. Santiago. 
Vida, I. & Fairhurst, A. (1998), "International expansion of retail firms: A theoretical 
approach for future investigations". Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 5, 
143-151. 
Vida, I., Reardon, J. & Fairhurst, A. (2000), "Determinants of international retail 
involvement: The case of large U.S. retail chains". Journal of International 
Marketing, 8, 37. 
Wallstreetjournal (2008) Chile Retailer Sets Expansion. Wall Street Journal. 
Welsh, D., H.B., Alon, I. & Falbe, C. M. (2006), "An Examination of International Retail 
Franchasing in Emerging Markets". Journal of Small Business Management,, 44, 130-
149. 
Westney, E. D. (1993) Institutionalization theory and the multinational firm. IN THE 
MACMILLAN PRESS, L. (Ed.) 
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E. & Peng, M. W. (2005), "Guest Editors' 
Introduction: Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the 
Conventional Wisdom". The Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1-33. 
Yeoh, P.-L. (2000), "Information acquisition activities: A study of global start-up exporting 
companies". Journal of International Marketing, 8, 36. 
Yin, R. K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage 
Publications. 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Figure 1: Virtuous Cycle Model of Integrated Multi-Format Retailing 
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Table 1: Falabella’s Corporate Information (December 31, 2009) 
 
Item Chile Argentina Peru Colombia Total 
Revenues  
(MM US$) 
5,108 431 1,161 202 6,950 
Market Weight 
in Total Sales 
73.5% 6.2% 16.7% 2.9% 100% 
Department 
Stores (#) 
39 10 15 9 73 
Home Improv. 
Stores (#) 
65 4 13 19 101 
Food Retail 
Stores (#) 
26 0 17 0 43 
Real Estate (# 
Malls) 
11 0 2 0 13 
Floor Space 
(m2) 
867,768 105,737 274,318 246,494 1,494,317 
CMR Accounts 
(#) 
2,6000.000 720,000 1,300.000 430,000 5,050,000 
Employees (#) 43,000 4,000 16,000 6,000 69,000 
Source: Developed by the author based on Annual Report 2009 (www.falabella.com) 
 
  
 
Table 2: Falabella Growth 1993–2009 (in Ch$) 
 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
 
2009 
Consolidated 
Revenues in 
MM Ch $ 381,233 466,254 512,757 559,812 632,359 771,537 849372 1,063,099 1,607,096 1,974,572 2,278,193 3,071,798 3,727,187 
 
 
 
3,524,441 
Consolidated 
Profits in MM 
Ch $ 54,559 61,538 47,923 46,406 49,214 53,615 70,564 100,872 125,481 161,201 217,09 217,09 197,367 
 
 
 
199,018 
CMR 
Accounts 
(thousands)  N/A N/A 2,200 2,500 2,600 2,700  3,000 3,200 3,400  3,900 4,300 4,800 5,000 
 
 
 
5,100 
Total Number 
of Stores 
26 31 38 37 39 48 52 102 121 130 114 175 212 
 
 
 
230 
Total Floor 
Area (sq. 
mts.) 
141,190  187,600  220,800 257,560 272,400 294,570 314,570 721,000  743,170 831,265 954,410  1,215,110 1,457,800 
 
 
 
1,494,317 
 
